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1	ADOLPH M. KOVEN, ESQ. Arb. Case #69 304 Greenwich Street							
2	San Francisco, California 94133 Telephone: (415)392-6548							
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6	IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO TITLE 102 OF THE							
7	CURRENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES							
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10	In the Matter of a Controversy)							
11	between							
12	INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF) ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL) OPINION AND AWARD							
13	UNION NO. 1245, AFL-CIO, OF THE							
14	and BOARD OF ARBITRATION							
15	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY,)							
16	Involving the grievance of)							
17								
18								
19	This Arbitration arises pursuant to Agreement between the							
20	INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO.							
21	1345, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and							
22	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, hereinafter referred to as the							
23	"Company," under which ADOLPH M. KOVEN was selected to serve as							
24	Chairman of a Board of Arbitration whose members also included							
25	LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member; MANUEL A. MEDEROS, Union							
26	Board Member; DAVID J. BERGMAN, Company Board Member; and RAY T.							
27	BUFKIN, JR., Company Board Member; and under which the Award of							
28	the Board of Arbitration would be final and binding upon the							
29	parties.							
30	Hearing was held May 18, 1978 in San Erancisco, California.							
5 1	The parties were afforded full opportunity for the examination							

and cross-examination of witnesses, the introduction of relevant

1	exhibits, and for argument. Both parties filed post-hearing							
2	briefs.							
3	APPEARANCES:							
4	On behalf of the Union:							
5	JOHN L. ANDERSON, ESQ.							
6	Neyhart, Anderson & Nussbaum 100 Bush Street, Suite 2600							
7	San Francisco, California 94104							
8	On behalf of the Company:							
9	LAWRENCE V. BROWN, JR., ESO. Pacific Gas & Electric Company							
10	245 Market Street San Francisco, California 94106							
ונ	ISSUE							
12	Can the Board of Arbitration order							
13	that the discharge of the grievant be pursued under the provisions of							
14	Title 102, as supplemented, of the Physical Labor Agreement? If so,							
15	was the discharge in violation of the Agreement?							
16	RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE CONTRACT							
17	TITLE 102							
18	102.2 The decision of a majority of the Board							
19	shall be final and binding provided that such de- cision does not in any way add to, disregard, or modi-							
20	fy any of the provisions of this Agreement.							
21	102.6 Grievances on the following enumerated subjects shall be determined by the grievance procedure							
22	established herein, provided they are referred to Com- pany within the time limit specified:							
23	(a) Interpretation or application of any of the terms							
24	of this Agreement;							
25	(b) Discharge, demotion, suspension or discipline of an individual employee;							
26	(c) Disputes as to whether a matter is a proper subject							
27	for the grievance procedure.							
28	It is the desire of Company and Union that griev-							
29	ances be settled promptly. To facilitate their settle- ment, grievances shall be filed on the form adopted for such purpose and within the time limits established in							
30	subdivisions (1) and (2) hereof:							
31	(1) A grievance which involved the discharge of an employee shall be initiated and processed with-							
3 2	out undue delay, but in any event, such griev-							

ance shall be filed not later than 14 calendar days after an employee's discharge becomes effective. Company shall make a written report thereon within 2 work days after receipt of Union's written grievance.

(2) Grievances other than outlined in (1) above shall be filed not later than 30 calendar days after the date of the action complained of, or the date the employee became aware of the incident which is the basis for the grievance and the Company shall make a written report thereon within 7 calendar days after receipt of Union's written grievance.

102.14 In the event of the discipline, suspension, demotion or discharge of an employee, Company shall, at Union's request, state in writing the reason therefor.

V1. EXTENSION OF TIME LIMITS

The purpose of providing for this procedure is to encourage the expeditious resolution of grievances. For this reason, the time limits provided herein are absolute.

FACTS:

The grievant was suspended on July 19, 1977, for an unauthorized absence in connection with his arrest on charges not connected with his employment. The Union filed a grievance to challenge the suspension. The grievance was discharged on November 18, 1977, after the Company received notification that he had pleaded "nolo contendere" to a felony. The Union did not file a second grievance to contest the discharge, and the issue is whether its failure to do so precludes the grievant from challenging the discharge under the grievance provisions in the Contract.

After the first grievance was filed, the fact finding committee held a meeting regarding the suspension. However, at that time, October 11, the Company had no information regarding the status of the grievant's case, such as the date of his trial and the exact basis of the charges against him. The Company took the position that it could not resolve the grievant's status until final disposition of the criminal charges against him. Another grievance committee meeting was held on December 8, and only the

suspension was discussed at that meeting. The parties agreed to refer the matter to arbitration, but the Company refused to include the propriety of the discharge in the issues to be arbitrated because the Union had not filed a second grievance regarding the discharge.

According to the Company, the Union representative stated at the meeting of the fact finding Committee that the Union was concerned that the grievant was not being paid during the period of suspension and that when the court proceedings were concluded, if the Company discharged the grievant, the Union might agree with the Company's determination that discharge was justified.

In two prior situations in which an employee had been suspended and then discharged, the Union filed a grievance regarding the suspension but did not file a later grievance protesting the discharge. Nevertheless, in those two cases the question of the validity of the discharge was considered in the grievance proceedings provided for in the Contract. The Company had denied a number of grievances in the past because they were not timely filed.

POSITION OF COMPANY:

The Union's failure to file a timely grievance protesting the discharge and to first process the grievance through the lower steps of the grievance procedure is improper. The parties have agreed to an exhaustive and detailed procedure to handle grievances, and the Union's demand that the discharge grievance be heard even though no grievance has been filed amounts to a demand that the whole procedure be scrapped. Under the Contract, the grievance must be filed on a proper form with the proper person (\$102.6). The time limits for filing and processing grievances are the backbone of the grievance settlement procedures, and they require that a grievance protesting a discharge must be filed within 14 calendar days of the discharge. The time limits pro-

vided in the Contract are absolute (¶V1, Supplemental Grievance Procedure). There is no provision for waiving time limitations.

While it is true that arbitrators do not favor final decisions based upon procedural defaults, an arbitrator may not change the provisions of the Contract regarding time limits for the filing of grievances (Cement Asbestos Products Co., 70 LA 180). The Contract (§102.2) provides that the Board may not add to, disregard, or modify the Contract, and the terms of the submission agreement itself, as set forth in a statement of the issue above, reinforce this proposition.

The Contract treats discharge and suspension as different actions since various provisions refer to suspension or discharge of an employee in the alternative (§102.14, Title 7). Thus, the filing of a grievance protesting a suspension does not amount to a grievance protesting the discharge. A decision by Arbitrator Burns reinforces this difference between discharge and suspension, for it holds that although a discharge was not justified, a suspension for a period within which the Company could investigate the cause of discipline was allowable.

Although the Union contends that there is a past practice in its favor, there are several distinctions between the situations upon which it relies and the present case. In the two cases relied upon by the Union, the issues of the discharges were raised in the first step of the grievance procedures within the time frames within which the grievances could have been filed. Secondly, the cases upon which the Union relies involved considerations of the grievance at levels below the Review Committee level and such errors are not precedent setting even if the committees at those lower levels erred in considering the discharge without the filing of grievances. Where timeliness errors have been discovered in the Review Committee, the Company has rejected the grievances because they were untimely filed.

The Review Committee has been dealing with grievance procedures for twenty-five years, and the two cases relied upon by the Union cannot be permitted to override the language of the Contract in the face of the well established rule that even a clear waiver in some instances, but not others, cannot take precedence over clear and unambiguous language in the Contract. Where a contract contains clear and specific time limits for filing grievances and the parties have neither agreed to waive such limits and there is not evidence of lax enforcement or waiver of the employee's right to claim non-arbitrability, an arbitrator would exceed his authority if he were to override the clear time limitations set out in the contract (Gore Newspapers, Inc., 63 LA 538).

POSITION OF UNION:

Contractual provisions for filing of grievances should be construed to avoid forfeitures. The Company had timely notice of the grievant's claim from the filing of a grievance regarding the suspension, and it was not prejudiced by his failure to file an additional grievance when the suspension ripened into a discharge. In Dow Jones and Company, 66 LA 1271, a fifteen month delay in grieving an issue did not bar arbitration because the employer was not placed at a disadvantage as a result of the delay. Many other arbitration decisions are consistent with this holding (Dow Jones and Company, 67 LA 965; Exhibitors Film Delivery & Service, 67 LA 983; E. F. Hauserman, 42 LA 1076).

Here the Union filed a timely grievance at the time of the suspension, and the subsequent discharge involved no new facts or issues. The discharge should be rationally viewed as covered by and incorporated into the original grievance. Indeed, the Company had a greater awareness of the circumstances relating to the criminal proceedings against the grievant than the Union. There is no action that the Company would have taken, nor did it

refrain from taking action, as a result of the Union's failure to file a separate grievance relating to the discharge.

In addition, the Union demonstrated that the Company had previously treated suspension and subsequent discharge as one issue for grievance and arbitration purposes. Since there is one set of facts to be investigated and one set of findings to be made, this is a reasonable approach. Suspension and discharge merely represent varying degrees of discipline for the same offense.

The Company's exhibits which showed that the Company has refused to consider certain grievances because they were untimely relate only to general aspects of untimely filing and not to the specific situation involved in the present dispute. Some of the examples relied upon by the Company in this regard focus on the effect of a timely grievance and the Company took the position in those situations that the time limits are designed to prevent stale claims and prejudice to the Company from delays. Neither of these situations applies in the present case.

CONCLUSION:

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The critical inquiry in the resolution of this dispute is not whether the time limits for a grievance involving a dischagre may be excused in certain circumstances, but whether the requirement that a grievance be filed to challenge a discharge is satisfied by the filing of a grievance to challenge a suspension which ultimately ripens into discharge. That is, the Union does not claim that it is entitled to file a grievance challenging the discharge at a time later than specified in the Contract, but that it is not required to file a separate claim at all.

Section 102.6 of the Contract provides that a grievance challenging a discharge must be filed within 14 calendar days after the discharge becomes effective. If there had been no suspension prior to discharge in the present case, the 14 day re-

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quirement would clearly be applicable. But where, as here, a discharge precedes a suspension, the past practice of the parties has been to treat the two together so that a grievance chal-lenging the suspension has been treated as a grievance which also challenges the propriety of the discharge which follows. The Union demonstrated that in two prior cases only a suspension grievance was filed, but the propriety of the discharge was nevertheless considered by the grievance committees as included within the suspension grievance, without the filing of a separate discharge grievance.

The Company challenges the past practice in various regards. It asserts, first, that the Union has demonstrated only two grievances in the twenty-five years that the grievance procedure has been in effect where the filing of a discharge grievance was excused, and that these two examples should not be deemed to constitute a past practice. However, the Company presented no evidence to counter the Union's assertion that no second grievance is required in the suspension-discharge situation, so that it cannot be assumed that there are any cases involving a similar situation in which a second grievance protesting a discharge was required. The only examples put forth by the Company regarding past practice involved general timeliness requirements and not the requirements for grieving a discharge after a suspension has already been grieved.

Another ground upon which the Company challenges the Union's showing of past practice is that in the two cases relied upon by the Union, the grievance committee meetings at which the discharges were considered occurred within 14 days of the discharge. But this factor is not directly applicable to the question whether a second grievance is required. In any event, the grievance committees in those cases simply proceeded to consider the discharge issues without reference to timeliness or whether a

 discharge grievance was filed. In these circumstances, the fact that the grievance hearings happened to occur within the 14 day period is not a strong factor in the Company's favor.

Finally, the Company challenges the past practice on the ground that the committees which considered the discharges even though no discharge grievances were filed were committees lower than the Review Committee, and that only the Review Committee sets precedent. But the issue here is not whether determinations made by these lower committees set precedent but whether their practice indicates that no second grievance is required where a discharge follows a suspension and the suspension has been grieved.

Thus, the past practice favors the Union's position. There are other factors as well which are in favor of the Union. There is a very strong policy against forfeitures, and absent prejudice to the opposing party in a dispute, arbitrators are reluctant to impose a forfeiture. Although the Company is correct that time limits for the filing of grievances are to be enforced in accord with the provisions of the Contract, the showing made by the Union that both the Company and the Union have previously interpreted the Contract to eliminate the need for a second grievance in a situation like the one here constitutes a convincing factor in the Union's favor.

Another matter which cannot be ignored is that the investigation and findings required for both the suspension and discharge are substantially identical in the situation where a discharge follows a suspension.

To require strict compliance with the 14 day provision for the filing of grievance following a discharge is unwarranted as here (1) the parties have previously interpreted the Contract not to require a second grievance; (2) the Company has not been prejudiced in any way since it is on notice that its action imposing

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1	discipline based upon a particular event is being challenged;
2	and (3) support of the Company's position would result in a for-
3	feiture since the validity of the discharge could not be chal-
4	lenged.
5	Thus, under all the circumstances, the Board of Arbitration
6	may order that the discharge of the grievant be pursued under
7	the provisions of Title 102, as supplemented by the Physical Labo
8	Agreement. With respect to whether the discharge was in violation
9	of the Agreement, since no evidence was produced on that question
ro	that issue is not reached in this proceeding.
11	AWARD A.
Le	The Board of Arbitration may or-
13	ders that the discharge of the grievant be pursued under the pro-
14	visions of Title 102, as supple- mented by the Physical Labor Agree-
15	ment. With respect to whether the discharge was in violation of the
16	Agreement, since no evidence was
17	produced on that question, that issue is not reached in this pro-
18	ceeding.
19	$A \rightarrow A \rightarrow$
20	Dated: (2-21-78) () () () () () ()
21	ADOLPH M. KOVEN, Charrman
22	Concur:
23	Laurence n. Joss Dated: 12-13-78
24	LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member Dated: 12-13-78
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98	manual Manual Dated: 12-13-78
27	MANUEL A. MEDEROS, Union Board Member Dated: 12-/3-78
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89	DAVID I BERGMAN Company Dated:
30	DAVID J. BERGMAN, Company Board Member
31	Charles of the same of the sam
52	RAY T. BUFKIN JR., Company Board Member Dated: 11-3-78
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9	DAVID J. BERGMAN	, Company Boa	rd Member	Dated: 12	13.18	
10	GliBuhial			Dated: //	1/3/28	
11	RAY T. BUFFIN, J	R., Company B	oard Member	Dated.	710/10	
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