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IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 102.12 OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1963

In the Matter of a Controversy

between

LOCAL UNION NO. 1245 OF INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO,

and

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Involving allegedly unjust demotion of B

OPINION AND AWARD

<u>OF</u>

BOARD OF ARBITRATION

This Arbitration arises pursuant to Agreement between LOCAL UNION NO. 1245, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," under which Adolph M. Koven was selected to serve as Chairman of a Board of Arbitration composed of Arthur M. Kezer and E. C. Drew for the Company and Shirley M. McPherson and Daniel J. McPeak for the Union, and under which the Award of the Board of Arbitration would be final and binding upon the parties.

APPEARANCES: 1 On behalf of the Union: 2 MESSRS. NEYHART & GRODIN by JOSEPH R. GRODIN, Esq., 3 Attorneys at Law Russ Building 4 San Francisco, California; 5 On behalf of the Company: 6 L. V. BROWN, Esq. Attorney at Law 7 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 245 Market Street 8 San Francisco, California 9 HENRY J. LAPLANTE, Esq. Attorney at Law 10 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 11 245 Market Street San Francisco, California. 12 13 ISSUE 14 Will the demotion of the grievant be sustained? 15 FACTS 16 The grievant was first employed in 1957 and has been a 17 Gas Service Man since 1960. He was demoted to the job of 18 Helper on February 12, 1966, as a result of charges of immoral 19 conduct which were made by Mrs. Parameter, on 20 February 5, 1966, and after the Company investigated those 21 charges (Tr. 5-6, 18, 52, 69-70, 80-81). 22 The Part Incident: 23 The grievant arrived at customer Parker's residence 24 about 9:00 AM in response to a phone request to repair the gas 25 heater (Tr. 18, 81). Mrs. Person, a 15-year-old pregnant 26 housewife wearing a bathrobe, who was alone in the house, 27 answered the door, let the grievant in and showed him the heater 28 in the living room (Tr. 20-21, 24, 33, 38, 73, 81). While the 29 grievant was working on the heater, Mrs. Parkers was sitting 30 on a couch across the room (Tr. 27, 82). Mrs. P 21 tified that the grievant was working on the heater for 20 to 32

25 minutes or longer during which time he played with the dog, 1 and talked about his dog and two daughters, one of whom he said 2 was one or two years younger than Mrs. Person (Tr. 19, 27, 3 4 working on the heater, that he knocked the dog away when it 5 came to him, and that he advised Mrs. Personal about keeping 6 the heater clean (Tr. 81-83).

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The grievant testified that he spent five to six minutes

testified that the grievant asked if anything was wrong with the stove; that, even though she answered, "No," he walked into the kitchen and took off the top burners, and that the following conversation and action then took place: The grievant asked Mrs. Personal if she was just married, and when Mrs. Person answered, "Yes," the grievant asked, "Do you like it better now than you did before?" and when Mrs. Personal again answered "Yes," the grievant asked, "What's the matter, didn't you get enough?" Mrs. P said that was not what she meant, and when she started to walk from the kitchen, the grievant stepped in front of her and "placed his hands on her below the waist" after which he stepped back, apologized and asked Mrs. Personal not to tell her husband, that he had lost his head, and that he did not know what he was doing. He said, "If you don't tell him, I'll come and clean your heater in my spare time." (Tr. 19-20, 28-9) The grievant admitted checking the stove after Mrs. Personal had told him of a yellow flame on the stove, but he denied any conversation of the kind testified to by Mrs. Particle, and denied standing any closer than three feet from Mrs. P (Tr. 83-5). The grievant testified that he was at the Pters residence about ten minutes and that Mrs. Personal was not upset when he left (Tr. 85).

Mrs. P testified that after the grievant left, she got dressed, went to a neighbor's home, related some of

what had happened, was given sedatives, and was picked up by her mother (Tr. 19, 21, 30). A Company representative who interviewed the neighbor said that the neighbor found Mrs.

Physterical, and had difficulty finding out what had happened (Tr. 53-4).

The grievant testified that the following series of events occurred after he left the Personal residence: he went to a residence close by to read the meter but was unable to do so since the gate was locked as it had been the previous day, and he did not bother to change the card which he had left the previous day (contrary to Company practice, which requires another card or changing the date on the old card when a following call is made), and he left at 9:15 AM (Tr. 86, 94); (2) he drove two and one-half miles and read a meter at 6240 Washatch; (3) he then drove to 5000 Springfield, arriving about 9:30 AM (Tr. 87). He spent 45 minutes adjusting the range with the customer present, and during which time a garbage truck was across the street (Tr. 87-8); (4) the grievant then drove to a cafe to meet another serviceman, arriving at 10:25 AM (Tr. 89). The driver of the garbage truck remembered seeing the grievant on February 5, 1966, at 5000 Springfield between 9:30 and 10:00 AM (Un. Ex. 1).

Mrs. Person testified that the serviceman wore glasses (Tr. 25-26). The grievant and his wife both testified that the grievant does not wear glasses (Tr. 81, 93, 108).

Company Investigation:

On February 5, 1966, Mrs. Parameter 's mother telephoned the Company and stated that a serviceman molested her daughter (Tr. 38, 57). Two Company representatives went immediately to the mother's home where they found Mrs. Parameters hysterical and incoherent and could not interview her for 15 minutes (Tr. 39, 57). When she could speak, three sets of notes were made

by Company representatives of Mrs. Parameter's statements (Tr. 39, 42, 57).

When they left at 12:10 PM, the Company representatives did not know the identity of the serviceman who was accused of molesting Mrs. Parameter, but one said to the other that it was the grievant because of the grievant's involvement in a 1962 complaint which bore similarities to Mrs. Parameters's statement (in the 1962 incident, the grievant was off work for one day and was reinstated with back pay) (Tr. 39-40, 49-50, 60, 90). In the 1962 incident as well as in the Parameters' incident, the Company testified that the grievant made essentially the same statement: "Well, if you don't tell your husband or you don't tell anybody, I will come back on my day off and work on your heater."

When the Company representatives returned to the Company office, they checked the records which showed that the serviceman who called on Mrs. Person was the grievant (Tr. 44, 50). A meeting was held that afternoon at which the grievant, in the presence of the shop steward, was confronted with the statements of Mrs. Person (Tr. 50-52).

On the following day, three Company representatives again interviewed Mrs. Personnel and they confirmed her statements of the previous day (Tr. 52-53, 70).

The Company testified that the duties of its servicemen include performing domestic and commercial service work, adjusting gas appliances, etc., and that they work alone and unsupervised. Helpers do not go into people's homes and only work under direct supervision (Tr. 55-56).

Mrs. Permanent filed a claim against the Company alleging that the grievant placed a hand under her bathrobe and touched her in the area of her genitals (Tr. 24, 72-3).

The Union requested that the joint investigating

committee conduct a joint interview of Mrs. Parameter and her neighbor, but the Company refused although it did not attempt to stop any interview by the Union (Tr. 103-104). The record does not reflect that the Union interviewed Mrs. Parameter.

DISCUSSION

In this case a service man of the Gas Company was charged by a female customer with having made immoral advances to her. As a result, the employee was demoted to a non-customer-contact job, which carried a lower rate of pay. Since essentially all we have by way of evidence in this case is the customer's charge of immoral conduct against the grievant counterposed only by the grievant's denial, a central question becomes what quantum of proof is required of the Company in order for it to justify the man's demotion.

The Arbitrator agrees with the Union that where discharge occurs for alleged misconduct involving the stigma of general social disapproval, the evidence must be clearly and convincingly established, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Union goes further and says that if the alleged conduct involves general social disapproval, and demotion, not discharge, results, the same standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should nonetheless be required.

The Arbitrator does not agree with the Union that the required quantum of proof in discharge cases involving general social disapproval automatically applies to demotion cases. To always require this standard in demotions disregards the objective reality that demotion, unlike discharge, generally carries less social stigmata, and that demotion, unlike discharge, does not sever the employment relationship but instead looks to a continuance of it. Obviously when an individual is retained in employment, his social image ordinarily has not been altered as

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much as when he is expelled from employment. For example, in demotions generally no loss of plant seniority and no loss of other contractural rights occur and the dilution of one's social standing is not held out for all the world to see and judge in the same way as in the case of discharge. That is not to say that every demotion should automatically require a lesser standard of proof. For example, if the demotion were a subterfuge and was imposed as a substitute for discharge because the Company knew it would be unable to satisfy a higher quantum of proof, or if the demotion held the grievant up to serious obloquy among his co-workers or others comparable to that which would be created by discharge (e.g. where the demotion had harsh punitive connotations as in the case of a long-term tool and die maker who is demoted to the job of a janitor), the greater quantum of proof under those circumstances would seem more appropriate. But in a so-called "bona fide" demotion case involving moral turpitude, other relevant factors in addition to the extent of social disapproval may be considered in establishing what quantum of proof is to be required. inquiry is not so much for the arbitrator to decide whether the grievant actually performed the act with which he is charged, but rather whether the Company had reasonable or sufficient cause to insulate the grievant from public contact. To determine that question is a relatively objective matter since the focus becomes what the Company did by way of investigation, issues of credibility, the weight of the testimony for and against the grievant, and the particular requirements, if any, of the Company's business operations.

An underlying important and seriously relevant factor in this case is that this Company is a public utility widely engaged in a public-contact type of business. There is not one home in the community which it does not service. A

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primary requirement of its operation is to exercise great caution in sending employees into the homes of its customers. Furthermore, because of its widespread contact with the public, the Company is particularly sensitive to litigation. Assume for the moment that the Company retained in a public-contact position a person whom it had reasonable cause to believe might engage in immoral conduct but whose guilt beyond a reasonable doubt had not been established. If in the future that person actually engaged in such conduct, the Company would obviously be vulnerable to public criticism and to private litigation that might involve serious charges of gross negligence and punitive damages.

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Two Company representatives on the day the complaint was made, and three Company representatives shortly thereafter on a second occasion, interviewed Mrs. P The results of those two interviews were consistent with each other and substantially consistent with Mrs. Personal 's testimony at the hearing. Furthermore, the grievant was promptly confronted by the Company with the charges against him. fact that it did so and the manner in which the Company conducted its investigation points to the conclusion that the prob-1em was a serious problem to the Company and that it sincerely desired to reach a fair appraisal of the facts. Aside from Mrs. Person 's bare charge and the grievant's bare denial, the only major conflict in the testimony occurred on how long the grievant was present in the Parkers residence. The grievant says that he was there for ten minutes; Mrs. P he was there for forty minutes. Evidence was produced that the grievant completed a number of assignments after leaving the residence, which was intended to show that he could not have been at the Personal residence for 40 minutes. However, the evidence did not establish with certainty the exact

time he actually spent in her home. Irrespective of which version is accepted, the actions which Mrs. Person complained of obviously could have taken place in either time period with the result that this particular testimonial conflict on how long the grievant actually spent in the Person house need not be resolved nor does this point become a major strategic fact.

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- The fact that the grievant had been charged with similar misconduct in a prior incident some years before does not in itself prove that the grievant actually engaged in the misconduct which Mrs. Program charges or even that he actually engaged in that prior misconduct. What is particularly significant about that prior incident is that a Company employee recalled that the grievant was charged with using language which was so similar to that used in the Parameter cases that one of the Company investigators was able, because of that remembrance, to independently connect the grievant to the P situation even before he actually knew that the grievant was the specific person charged by Mrs. Person. Admittedly, this evidence is hearsay to prove that the grievant actually made that statement on that prior occasion since the person who charged the grievant with that original statement was not present at the hearing. However, when added to the Company's own full investigation, this evidence has great vitality in establishing the Company's state of mind and that it had reasonable cause to believe that the incident as described by Mrs. P actually occurred.
- (4) The only way in which the credibility of Mrs. Remaining might have been put in issue is whether she had psychological problems which would cause her to give false testimony. Based upon the record, nothing was shown to lead to the conclusion that her testimony should not be credited for this reason. It is true that she sought psychiatric treatment after the

incident, but no showing was made that any psychiatric disturbance was present before the incident occurred. That she is a young girl of fifteen and was pregnant at the time of the incident understandably raises some suspicion of her emotional stability, but obviously that fact standing alone cannot become the determinative fact to conclude that her testimony cannot be believed.

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A troublesome basic aspect to this case is that if we assume that the incident never occurred at all and if the grievant is really blameless, it is impossible to understand why Mrs. Program would charge him with immoral conduct. We might speculate about her motivation and state of mind but there is no proof that she concocted the story against him. No showing was made that she was hallucinating and no proof of personal animosity against the grievant was produced. The only remaining factor which is potentially susceptible of some inference to her disadvantage is that following the incident Mrs. P filed suit against the Company for damages. But again that fact standing alone in the absence of other proof to show that the incident did not in fact occur does not lead to the conclusion that she actually fabricated her charges against the grievant for personal gain. Testimony by Mrs. Parameter as well as by the Company that she was genuinely hysterical when she went to her neighbor's house immediately following the incident is clearly entitled to be credited, and no evidence was produced that she communicated with anyone between the time of the incident and the time she went to the neighbor's house. One cannot therefore come to the conclusion that she had anyone's help during that short interval immediately following the incident in fabricating a story for personal gain.

A last, but minor, discrepancy in the testimony of the grievant and Mrs. Personnel involves a statement by the grievant

that he had no personal conversation with her during the time he was in her home. But Mrs. Personal says the grievant told her that he had a daughter within a couple of years of her own age. At the hearing the grievant specifically denied this conversation although the fact is that he does have a daughter of that age. Somewhat of a doubt as to the grievant's credibility therefore arises since Mrs. Personal most probably would have had no way of knowing this fact other than through the conversation with the grievant on the day of the incident.

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One of the major implied thrusts of the Union's position is that Mrs. Programm's testimony and charges should be rejected because it is extremely difficult to show she was not to be believed. The Arbitrator grants that it would indeed be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to show that Mrs. Page 1980. perjured herself. But the actual fact of the matter is that she was not shown to have perjured herself and though her testimony, because of her pending suit against the Company, became self-serving, so to speak, a posteriori, so is the grievant's testimony self-serving. To disbelieve her solely for the reason that it is difficult or impossible to disprove her testimony would be an improper basis for deciding the case, and the more appropriate approach to this factual situation is whether the Company had reasonable and sufficient cause to insulate the grievant from public contact. In this connection, the following factors cannot be disregarded: that the results of the Company's bona fide investigation led it to sincerely believe that the grievant had engaged in the conduct with which he was charged; that no persuasive evidence was developed which would require that Mrs. Person's testimony should be disbelieved; and that the grievant's probable use of the same words both on the P occasion and on a prior occasion, namely, "if you don't tell your husband or you don't tell any-

body, I will come back on my day off and clean your heater"
could legitimately be used by the Company to confirm the judgment
of his guilt which emerged as a result of its bona fide investigation. When the character of the Company's business and its
relationship to the public, its sensitive vulnerability to private litigation and to public criticism, is added to the combination of factors in the grievant's disfavor, the Arbitrator can
only conclude that the Company had the right to remove him from
his public-contact job. In the Arbitrator's opinion, the
Company's action is to be sustained despite the fact that if
the proof against the grievant required a quantum of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the case against him could not survive.

Whether there were non-public-contact jobs elsewhere with the Company, which would not be considered demotions and for which the grievant was qualified, was not indicated in the record. It can only be assumed that there were none, which would then justify the placing of the grievant in a lower paying position in order to preclude him from working in a public-contact position.

AWARD

The demotion of the grievant is sustained.

DATED:

olph M. Koven, Chairman

Board of Arbitration

(Other signatures on following page.)

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3	Arthur M. Kezer, Company Board Member	Dated: /23/27/967
4	Colum	Dated: F.l-27 /967
5	E. C. Drew, Company Board Member	
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7	Shirley M. McPherson, Union Board Member	Miles de la companya del companya de la companya del companya de la companya de l
8		Data J.
9	Daniel J. McPeak, Union Board Member	Dated:
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12	DISSENT:	
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14	Arthur M. Kezer, Company Board Member	Dated:
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16	E. C. Drew, Company Board Member	Dated:
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18	Shirley M. McPherson, Union Board	Dated: Rbuay 27, 196)
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20	Daniel J. Moreak, Union Board Member	Dated: Fabray 27, 196)
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